Western Concern Over Security Of Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal

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Western Concern over Security of Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal

By Mamnoon Ahmad Khan

Ever since Pakistan has acquired its nuclear capability, the only question that has been asked repeatedly by United States and the West is “Whether Pakistan would be able to secure her nuclear arsenal or not”?

During times of relative political and social normalcy, the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is probably adequate and could be expected to improve consistent with other nuclear programs worldwide. However, fallout from Pakistan’s decision to cooperate with the United States following the September 11th terrorist attacks may severely test Pakistan’s security system throughout its nuclear weapons complex. Instability in Pakistan could make its nuclear weapons and stocks of nuclear explosive material dangerously vulnerable to theft. If domestic instability leads to the downfall of the current Pakistani government, nuclear weapons and the means to make them could fall into the hands of a government hostile to the United States and its allies.

Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 60 nuclear warheads, although it could be

larger. Islamabad is producing fissile material, adding to related production facilities, and

deploying additional delivery vehicles. These steps will enable Pakistan to undertake both

quantitative and qualitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal. Whether and to what extent

Pakistan’s current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities is a response to the 2008

U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement is unclear. Islamabad does not have a public, detailed

nuclear doctrine, but its “minimum credible deterrent” is widely regarded as primarily a deterrent

to Indian military action.

Pakistan has in recent years taken a number of steps to increase international confidence in the

security of its nuclear arsenal. In addition to dramatically overhauling nuclear command and

control structures since September 11, 2001, Islamabad has implemented new personnel security

programs. Moreover, Pakistani and some U.S. officials argue that, since the 2004 revelations

about a procurement network run by former Pakistani nuclear official A.Q. Khan, Islamabad has

taken a number of steps to improve its nuclear security and to prevent further proliferation of

nuclear-related technologies and materials. A number of important initiatives, such as

strengthened export control laws, improved personnel security, and international nuclear security

cooperation programs have improved Pakistan’s security situation in recent years.

Instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability of these reforms into question. Some

observers fear radical takeover of a government that possesses a nuclear bomb, or proliferation by radical sympathizers within Pakistan’s nuclear complex in case of a breakdown of controls. While U.S. and Pakistani officials continue to express confidence in controls over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, continued instability in the country could impact these safeguards. For a broader discussion, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt. This report will be updated.

Western Worries

Chronic political instability in Pakistan and the current offensive against the Taliban in the

northwest of the country have called attention to the issue of the security of the country’s nuclear

weapons. Some Western observers fear that Pakistan’s strategic nuclear assets could be obtained by terrorists, or used by elements in the Pakistani government. Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Admiral Michael Mullen described U.S. concern about the matter during a September 22, 2008,

speech: To the best of my ability to understand it—and that is with some ability—the weapons there are secure. And that even in the change of government, the controls of those weapons haven’t changed. That said, they are their weapons. They’re not my weapons. And there are limits to what I know. Certainly at a worst-case scenario with respect to Pakistan, I worry a great deal

about those weapons falling into the hands of terrorists and either being proliferated or

potentially used. And so, control of those, stability, stable control of those weapons is a key

concern. And I think certainly the Pakistani leadership that I’ve spoken with on both the

military and civilian side understand that.

U.S. officials continue to be concerned about the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons in a

destabilized Pakistan. General David H. Petraeus, Commander, U.S. Central Command, testified

March 31, 2009, that “Pakistani state failure would provide transnational terrorist groups and

other extremist organizations an opportunity to acquire nuclear weapons and a safe haven from

which to plan and launch attacks.”

Nevertheless, U.S. officials have generally expressed confidence in the security of Pakistan’s

nuclear weapons. President Obama addressed this issue in an April 29, 2009, press conference,

stating, “I’m confident that we can make sure that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is secure, primarily,

initially, because the Pakistani army, I think, recognizes the hazards of those weapons falling into the wrong hands. We’ve got strong military-to-military consultation and cooperation.” He also recognized the sensitivity of the issue for Pakistan, saying, “We want to respect their sovereignty, but we also recognize that we have huge strategic interests, huge national security interests in making sure that Pakistan is stable and that you don’t end up having a nuclear-armed militant state.”1 Declining to engage in “hypotheticals” when asked if the United States is ready to secure the nuclear arsenal if the Pakistani government could not do so, President Obama said he felt “confident that that nuclear arsenal will remain out of militant hands.”

General Petraeus reaffirmed this confidence on May 10: “With respect to the—the nuclear

weapons and—and sites that are controlled by Pakistan … we have confidence in their security

procedures and elements and believe that the security of those sites is adequate.”2Admiral Mullen echoed this assessment during a May 14, 2009, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf told a journalist that Islamabad has “given State Department nonproliferation experts insight into the command and control of the Pakistani arsenal and its on-site safety and security procedures,”3 but U.S. knowledge of Pakistan’s arsenal remains limited, according to U.S. officials. Mullen stated that “we’re limited in what we actually know” about Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal. Leon Panetta, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, similarly acknowledged in a May 18 speech that the United States does not possess the intelligence to locate all of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons-related sites. Pakistani efforts to improve the security of its nuclear weapons have been on-going and include some cooperation with the United States. Since the 1998 Pakistani and Indian nuclear tests, the international community has increased attention to reducing the risk of nuclear war in South Asia.

The two countries most recently came to the brink of full-scale war in 1999 and 2002, and,

realizing the dangers, have developed some risk reduction measures to prevent accidental nuclear

war. Islamabad has also developed its command and control systems and improved security of

military and civilian nuclear facilities. Since the 2004 revelations of an extensive international

nuclear proliferation network run by Pakistani nuclear Scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, Islamabad has made additional efforts to improve export controls and monitor nuclear personnel. The main security challenges for Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal are keeping the integrity of the command structure, ensuring physical security, and preventing illicit proliferation from insiders.

Pakistan continues to produce fissile material for weapons and appears to be augmenting its

weapons production facilities, as well as deploying additional delivery vehicles—steps that will

enable both quantitative and qualitative improvements in Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal.

Nuclear Weapons

Pakistan’s nuclear energy program dates back to the 1950s, but it was the loss of East Pakistan

(now Bangladesh) in a bloody war with India that probably triggered a political decision in

January 1972 (just one month later) to begin a secret nuclear weapons program.4 Deterring India’s

nuclear weapons and augmenting Pakistan’s inferior conventional forces are widely believed to

be the primary missions for Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal. Observers point to India’s 1974

“peaceful” nuclear explosion as the pivotal moment that gave additional urgency to the program.

Pakistan produced fissile material for its nuclear weapons using gas-centrifuge-based uranium

enrichment technology, which it mastered by the mid-1980s. Highly-enriched uranium (HEU) is

one of two types of fissile material used in nuclear weapons; the other is plutonium. The

country’s main enrichment facility is a centrifuge plant located at Kahuta; Pakistan may have

other enrichment sites.5

Islamabad gained technology from many sources. This extensive assistance is reported to have

included uranium enrichment technology from Europe, blueprints for a small nuclear weapon

from China, and missile technology from China.

The United States had information during the 1970s and early 1980s that Pakistan was pursuing

nuclear weapons designs,6 but exactly when Pakistan produced a workable nuclear explosive

device is unclear. A 1985 National Intelligence Council report stated that Pakistan “probably has a workable design for a nuclear explosive device” and was “probably … a year or two away from a capacity to produce enough” highly enriched uranium for such a device. A 1993 National Security Council report to Congress stated that Islamabad’s nuclear weapons efforts “culminated with the capability to rapidly assemble a nuclear device if necessary by the end of the 1980s.”7A.Q. Khan stated in an interview published in May 1998 that Islamabad “attained” the capability to detonate such a device “at the end of 1984.”8 In any case, President Bush’s failure to certify in 1990 that Pakistan did not “possess a nuclear explosive device” led to a cut-off in military and financial aid under the Pressler Amendment.9 When India conducted nuclear weapon tests on May 12, 1998, Pakistan’s government responded two weeks later on May 28 and May 30 with six tests in western Pakistan. Test yields were about

10 kilotons and 5 kilotons, according to seismic analysis.10 The United States imposed additional

sanctions after the tests, but these were lifted after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. According to most public estimates, Pakistan has about 60 nuclear weapons,

though it could have more;11 a recent public estimate from two prominent experts on the subject

stated that the country has between 70 and 90 nuclear weapons.12Pakistan’s nuclear warheads use

an implosion design with a solid core of approximately 15-20 kilograms of HEU.13 Islamabad

reportedly continues to produce HEU for weapons at a rate of at least 100 kilograms per year.14

Pakistan has also pursued plutonium-based warheads and continues to produce plutonium for

weapons. Islamabad has received Chinese and European assistance for at least some of its

plutonium program. The 40-50 megawatt heavy-water Khushab plutonium production reactor has been operating since 1998.15It appears that Islamabad is constructing two additional heavy-water reactors, which will expand considerably Pakistan’s plutonium production capacity, at the same site.16 Additionally, Pakistan has a reprocessing facility17 at the Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology (PINSTECH) and is apparently constructing other such facilities. Nuclear Fuel reported in 2000 that, according to “senior U.S. government officials,” Islamabad had begun operating a “pilot-scale” reprocessing facility at the New Laboratories facility at PINSTECH.18 Pakistan also appears to be constructing a second reprocessing facility at the site 19 and may be completing a reprocessing facility located at Chasma.20 Islamabad’s construction of additional nuclear reactors and expansion of its reprocessing capabilities could indicate plans to increase and improve Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal in the near future. Indeed, Defense Intelligence Agency Director Michael Maples told the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 10, 2009, that “Pakistan continues to develop its nuclear infrastructure, expand nuclear weapon stockpiles and seek more advanced warheads and delivery systems.”21Similarly, Admiral Mullen confirmed during the May 14 hearing that the United States has “evidence” that Pakistan is expanding its nuclear arsenal. In reality Pakistan is striving hard to get rid from its acute power shortage by using its nuclear program for electricity generation.

Responding to India?

Pakistani officials have indicated that they have already determined the arsenal size needed for a

minimum nuclear deterrent and that they will not engage in an arms race with India.

Nevertheless, Pakistan appears to be increasing its fissile production capability and improving its

delivery vehicles in order to hedge against possible increases in India’s nuclear arsenal. Islamabad may also accelerate its current nuclear weapons efforts. India has stated that it needs only a “credible minimum deterrent,” but New Delhi has never defined what it means by such a deterrent and has refused to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Furthermore, both the agreement and associated 2008 decision by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to exempt India from some of its export guidelines will renew New Delhi’s access to the international uranium market. This access will result in more indigenous Indian uranium available for weapons because it will not be consumed by India’s newly safeguarded reactors.22 Pakistani officials have stated that the government may need to increase significantly its nuclear arsenal in response to possible Indian plans to do the same. According to an April 2006 television broadcast, Pakistani officials from the government’s National Command Authority expressed “concern” that the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear cooperation agreement could tilt the strategic balance between India and Pakistan in favor of the former. The officials suggested that Islamabad may need to increase or improve its nuclear arsenal in order to “to meet all requirements of minimum credible defence deterrence.”23 (See the “Nuclear Doctrine” section for more on Pakistan’s deterrence concept.) Similarly, Pakistan’s Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) wrote in July 2008 that the agreement could cause a nuclear arms race between Pakistan and India.24 Moreover, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson indicated during a May 21, 2009, press briefing that, despite the government’s continued opposition to a “nuclear or conventional arms race in South Asia,” Pakistan may need to increase its nuclear arsenal in response to Indian conventional and nuclear arms expansion.

Illustrating this point, a Pakistani Foreign Office spokesperson reacted to India’s July 26, 2009,

launch of its first indigenously built nuclear-powered submarine by asserting that “continued

induction of new lethal weapon systems by India is detrimental to regional peace and stability,”

adding that “[w]ithout entering into an arms race with India, Pakistan will take all appropriate

steps to safeguard its security and maintain strategic balance in South Asia.” The submarine,

which has not yet been deployed, will reportedly be capable of carrying nuclear-armed ballistic

missiles.25

Whether and to what extent Pakistan’s current expansion of its nuclear weapons-related facilities

is a response to the U.S.-India agreement is unclear, partly because the government’s decisions

regarding those facilities are not publicly available.

In addition to making qualitative and quantitative improvements to its nuclear arsenal, Pakistan

could increase the number of circumstances under which it would be willing to use nuclear

weapons. For example, Peter Lavoy has argued that India’s efforts to improve its conventional

military capabilities could enable New Delhi to achieve “technical superiority” in intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as precision targeting, providing India with “the

capability to effectively locate and efficiently destroy strategically important targets in

Pakistan.”26 Islamabad could respond by lowering the threshold for using nuclear weapons,

according to Lavoy. Indeed, a Pakistan Foreign Ministry spokesperson warned in May 2009 that

Islamabad could take this step. (See the “Nuclear Doctrine” section.)

Nevertheless, Islamabad’s nuclear weapons program apparently faces some budget constraints.

Maples testified that “the economic decline will likely slow” the government’s progress in

improving its nuclear and conventional military forces. Furthermore, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons

program is reportedly facing “severe financial cuts.”27

Delivery Vehicles

Pakistan has two types of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons: aircraft controlled by the

Pakistan Air Force and surface-to-surface missiles controlled by the Pakistan Army. Pakistan

could deliver its nuclear weapons using F-16s purchased from the United States, provided that

modifications are made. It is widely believed that Islamabad has made modifications to the F-16s

previously sold to them.28Although concerns have been raised about the impact of these sales on

the strategic balance in South Asia,29 the U.S. government maintains that the sale of additional F-

16s to Pakistan will not alter the regional balance of power.30 The contract for provision of an

additional 36 aircraft was signed on September 30, 2006, as was the contract for the weapons for

those aircraft and a contract to perform the mid-life upgrade on Pakistan’s F-16A/B model

aircraft. Pakistan’s F-16 fleet will therefore be expanded, but it is unclear what portion of the fleet will be capable of a nuclear mission. Mirage III and V aircraft could also be used, although would have limited range. A-5’s may have been modified to carry a nuclear payload.31

After India’s first test of its Prithvi ballistic missile in 1988, Pakistan jump-started its own missile program and has three types of ballistic missiles thought to be nuclear-capable: the solid-fuel Hatf-III (Ghaznavi), with a range of about 400 kilometers; the solid-fuel Hatf-IV (Shaheen), with a range of over 450 kilometers32 ; and the liquid-fuel Hatf-V (Ghauri), with an approximate range of almost 1,300 kilometers.33 34The solid-fuel Hatf-VI (Shaheen-2) missile, when deployed, will be “capable of reaching targets out to 2,000 kilometers,” Maples stated March 10,35 adding that Islamabad has made “significant progress” on the missile. A 2009 National Air and Space Intelligence Center report appears to support this conclusion, stating that the missile “probably

will soon be deployed.” Islamabad continues to carry out ballistic missile tests, but notifies India

in advance in accordance with an October 2005 bilateral missile pre-notification pact.36 Maples

also indicated that Pakistan is developing nuclear-capable cruise missiles; the Babur (groundlaunched) and the Ra’ad (air-launched), both of which will have estimated ranges of 320

kilometers.37

Nuclear Doctrine

Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine would therefore essentially revolve around the first-strike option. In other words Pakistan will use nuclear weapons if attacked by India even if the attack is with conventional weapons. With his American experience of a graduated nuclear response Professor Stephen P. Cohen feels that Pakistan would use what he calls an ‘option-enhancing policy’ for a possible use of nuclear weapons. This would entail a stage-by-stage approach in which the nuclear threat is increased at each step to deter India from attack. The first step could be a public or private warning, the second a demonstration explosion of a small nuclear weapon on its own soil, the third step would be the use of a few nuclear weapons on its own soil against Indian attacking forces. The fourth stage would be used against critical but purely military targets in India across the border from Pakistan. Probably in thinly populated areas in the desert or semi-desert, causing least collateral damage. this may prevent Indian retaliation against cities in Pakistan. Some weapon systems would be in reserve for the counter-value role. These weapons would be safe from Indian attack as some would be airborne while the ground based ones are mobile and could be moved around the country.

With some experience and the passage of time a degree of sophistication will certainly be introduced in Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine of the first-use of nuclear weapons to provide the government more options in the use of nuclear weapons. This would also avoid unessential collateral damage to cities and other population centres in both countries. The object would be to employ nuclear weapons if attacked yet cause the least civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure.

It must be appreciated that a nuclear device is not just another weapon with increased firepower. It is in fact a weapon of mass destruction and a whole new system, requiring new rules of command, control, communications, deployment and engagement. It is obvious that the control of this devastating weapon must rest firmly in the hands of the highest political authority in the country. In our case the Prime Minister. It is envisaged that the Prime Minister’s decision would be based on an earlier discussion in the Federal Cabinet, of the grave situation in the country pursuant to an armed conflict with India or danger of such a conflict. The matter would also have been discussed in the Defence Committee of the Cabinet which is responsible for defence and security of the country.

Although the decision to employ the nuclear option is that of the government. Yet it must be decided before hand as to when and to whom would the authority to use nuclear weapons be delegated in a crisis situation. India our potential enemy has numerical superiority in conventional forces and would have the advantage of initiative as an aggressor, time would therefore be of essence to the defender with numerical inferiority. Delegation of authority to use the nuclear option would therefore be essential. It may eventually be given to the commander of forces in the field under specified circumstances depending on the course and direction in which the battle unfolds to our eventual disadvantage.

Fast and secure communications is another essential factor in a nuclear environment. Communications from the Prime Minister and his security team through the shortest chain of command to the actual launch area of the nuclear weapon must be secure at all times.

As an ultimate precaution there must be presumed delegation of authority in cases where the seat of government has been wholly or partially destroyed and rendered ineffective by the enemy’s nuclear strike. This would also be applicable when a higher military headquarters has been knocked out and ceases to function effectively, temporarily or permanently.

Intelligence gathering would gain added importance in a nuclear environment. It would be essential to have accurate, up to date and timely information about our potential enemy’s additional troop, aircraft and ship deployments and their likely intentions. His preparations for a nuclear first strike must be known at the earliest.

For the daily conduct of the war it may well be appropriate to have a small committee under the Prime Minister with the ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs as members along with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. The Defence Secretary acting as secretary of the committee. In the final analysis it is possible that the Prime Minister representing the political will of the nation and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, representing the views and recommendations of the three services would be working together to provide the correct direction to the war effort.

It is suggested that Army’s Air Defence commands on geographical basis suitably augmented should be responsible to trace, identify and destroy incoming enemy missiles and to launch our own nuclear weapons. Two Air Defence Commands should control nuclear weapons on our Eastern borders, with the dividing line at Bahawalpur. By designating one headquarters to control and launch nuclear weapons, unity of command and safety of launch is maintained. There would therefore be one officer of three-star rank taking his orders from General Headquarters (GHQ), unless it has been delegated to a threatened Corps in a crisis situation.

The government must decide before hand when and at what stage of a military conflict with India it would be forced to employ the nuclear option. The threshold must be clear and unambiguous. To use the modern Jargon, the bottom line needs to be clearly defined to avoid a miscalculation.

To prevent a nuclear war by mistake, a misadventure or a miscalculation, certain confidence building measures would have to be taken urgently.

Owing to a much smaller number of nuclear weapons that could be maintained in South Asia compared to the nuclear powers, an elaborate command and control structure would not be necessary. The cost would consequently be modest as well. It is estimated to be in the region of 150 to 200 million rupees per year, for the next five years at least.

As far as cost of the nuclear weapons and their delivery system, it would depend on each country’s perception and requirement of a minimum nuclear deterrent. According to Amit Gupta in the Armed Forces Journal of September 1998, many analysts agree that India requires 100 to 150 nuclear weapons as a deterrent against China and Pakistan as a minimum. The estimated cost would be 714 million dollars a year for the next 10 years. In Pakistan a minimum deterrent could range between 30 to 50 nuclear weapons. Gen Mirza Aslam Beg calculates the cost to be in the range of 250 million dollars.

In a nuclear environment a Joint Staff HQ with added responsibility would be essential. Under it a new Nuclear Command could be created to control and co-ordinate all Nuclear effort in the country. Instructions to Service HQ would pass through this new command for clarity and security.

It is the opinion of some experts that having achieved nuclear status India and Pakistan should return to the pre-nuclear test era of ambiguity with regard to the nuclear response in an armed conflict. In other words the doctrine itself should provide some answers and leave others to the imagination creating some uncertainty and doubt in the aggressors’ mind. This would force caution and some delay, probably second thoughts, resulting in a prevention of conflict.

When all is said and done it must be the concern of both India and Pakistan to avoid a future armed conflict. The possession of nuclear weapons should be used to prevent war and bring peace to the region. The Prime Minister of Pakistan is committed to reducing tension in Indo-Pak relations and solving all disputes with India by peaceful means. India has taken a step forward in the Bus diplomacy which must be reciprocated in full measure for the benefit of the people of South Asia.

Pakistan’s strategic doctrine is undeclared, and will probably remain so, but prominent officials

and analysts have offered insights concerning its basic tenets.38 Describing the guiding principle

as minimum credible nuclear deterrence, high-level officials’ statements point to four policy

objectives for Islamabad’s nuclear weapons: deter all forms of external aggression; deter through

a combination of conventional and strategic forces; deter counterforce strategies by securing

strategic assets and threatening nuclear retaliation; and stabilize strategic deterrence in South

Asia.39 Pakistani officials have also indicated that this nuclear posture is designed to preserve

territorial integrity against Indian attack, prevent military escalation, and counter its main rival’s

conventional superiority.40

Pakistan has pledged no-first-use against non-nuclear-weapon states, but has not ruled out firstuse

against a nuclear-armed aggressor, such as India.41 Some analysts say this ambiguity serves to

maintain deterrence against India’s conventional superiority; the Foreign Ministry spokesperson

stated May 21 that “there are acquisitions of sophisticated weaponry by our neighbour which will

disturb the conventional balance between our two countries and hence, lower the nuclear

threshold.” Other analysts argue that keeping the first-use option against New Delhi allows

Islamabad to conduct sub-conventional operations, such as support for low intensity conflict or

proxy war in Kashmir, while effectively deterring India at the strategic level.42 Pakistan has

reportedly addressed issues of survivability through pursuing a second strike capability, possibly

building hard and deeply buried storage and launch facilities, deploying road-mobile missiles,

deploying air defenses around strategic sites, and utilizing concealment measures.43

Command and Control

Pakistan’s command and control over its nuclear weapons is compartmentalized and includes

strict operational security. The government’s command and control system is based on “C4I2SR” (command, control, communication, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance and reconnaissance). Islamabad’s Strategic Command Organization has a three-tiered structure, consisting of the National Command Authority (NCA), the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), and the Strategic Forces Commands.

The NCA, established in 2000, supervises the functions and administration of all of Pakistan’s

organizations involved in nuclear weapons research, development, and employment, as well as

the military services that operate the strategic forces.44 The Prime Minister, as Head of

Government, is Chairperson of the NCA.45 The NCA also includes the chair of the joint chiefs of

staff, the Ministers of Defense, Interior, and Finance, the Director- General of the SPD, and the

Commanders of the Army, Air Force, and Navy. The final authority to launch a nuclear strike

requires consensus within the NCA; the Chairperson must cast the final vote. The NCA is

comprised of two committees, the Employment Control Committee (ECC) and the Development

Control Committee (DCC), each of which includes a mix of civilian and military officials. The

ECC’s functions include establishing a command and control system over the use of nuclear

weapons. The DCC “exercises technical, financial and administrative control over all strategic

organisations, including national laboratories and research and development organisations

associated with the development and modernisation of nuclear weapons.”46

The SPD is headed by a Director General from the Army and acts as the secretariat for the NCA.

The SPD’s functions include formulating Islamabad’s nuclear policy, strategy, and doctrine;

developing the nuclear chain of command; and formulating operational plans at the service level

for the movement, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons. The Army, Air Force, and Navy each have their own strategic force command, but operational planning and control remains with the NCA. The SPD coordinates operational plans with the strategic forces commands. According to current and former Pakistani officials, Islamabad employs a system which requires that at least

two, and perhaps three, people authenticate launch codes for nuclear weapons. 47

On December 13, 2007, then-President Musharraf formalized these authorities and structure in

the “National Command Authority Ordinance, 2007.”48 The NCA was established by

administrative order, but now has a legal basis. Analysts point out that the timing of this

ordinance was meant to help the command and control system weather political transitions and

potentially preserve the military’s strong control over the system. The ordinance also addresses

the problems of the proliferation of nuclear expertise and personnel reliability. It outlines

punishable offenses related to breach of confidentiality or leakage of “secured information,” gives the SPD authority to investigate suspicious conduct, states that punishment for these offenses can be up to 25 years imprisonment, and applies to both serving and retired personnel, including military personnel, notwithstanding any other laws. As a result, Pakistani authorities say that the ordinance should strengthen their control over strategic organizations and their personnel.

Security Concerns

According to a 2001 Department of Defense report, Islamabad’s nuclear weapons “are probably

stored in component form,”49 which suggests that the nuclear warheads are stored separately from delivery vehicles. According to some reports, the fissile cores of the weapons are separated from the non-nuclear explosives.50 But whether this is actually the case is unclear; one report states that the warheads and delivery vehicles are probably stored separately in facilities close to one another, but says nothing about the fissile cores.51 And, according to an account of a 2008 experts’ group visit to Pakistan, Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, the head of the SPD, suggested that the nuclear warheads (containing the fissile cores) may be mated with their delivery vehicles.52 According to Kidwai, the report says, the SPD’s official position is that the weapons “will be ready when required, at the shortest notice; [but] the Pakistani doctrine is not endorsing a US-USSR model with weapons on hair trigger alert.” The 2001 Defense Department report says that Pakistan can probably assemble its weapons fairly quickly.53

It warrants mention that, although separate storage may provide a layer of protection against

accidental launch or prevent theft of an assembled weapon, it may be easier for unauthorized

people to remove a weapon’s fissile material core if it is not assembled. Dispersal of the assets

may also create more potential access points for acquisition and may increase the risk of

diversion.54

As the United States prepared to launch an attack on the Afghan Taliban after September 11,

2001, President Musharraf reportedly ordered that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal be redeployed to “at least six secret new locations.”55 This action came at a time of uncertainly about the future of the region, including the direction of U.S.-Pakistan relations. Islamabad’s leadership was uncertain whether the United States would decide to conduct military strikes against Pakistan’s nuclear assets if the government did not assist the United States against the Taliban. Indeed, President Musharraf cited protection of Pakistan’s nuclear and missile assets as one of the reasons for Islamabad’s dramatic policy shift.56

These events, in combination with the 1999 Kargil crisis, the 2002 conflict with India at the Line

of Control, and revelations about the A.Q. Khan proliferation network, inspired a variety of

reforms to secure the nuclear complex. Risk of nuclear war in South Asia ran high in the 1999

Kargil crisis, when the Pakistani military is believed to have begun preparing nuclear-tipped

missiles.57It should be noted that, even at the high alert levels of 2001 and 2002, there were no

reports of Pakistan mating the warheads with delivery systems.58

In the fall of 2007 and early 2008, some observers expressed concern about the security of the

country’s arsenal if political instability were to persist.59Former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto

said in a November 5, 2007, interview that, although then-President Musharraf claimed to be in

firm control of the nuclear arsenal, she feared this control could weaken due to instability in the

country.60Similarly, Michael Krepon of the Henry L. Stimson Center has argued that “a

prolonged period of turbulence and infighting among the country’s President, Prime Minister, and Army Chief” could jeopardize the army’s unity of command, which “is essential for nuclear

security.”61During that time, U.S. military officials also expressed concern about the security of

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.62 Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, also has expressed fears that a radical regime could take power in

Pakistan, and thereby acquire nuclear weapons.63 Experts also worry that while nuclear weapons

are currently under firm control, with warheads disassembled, technology could be sold off by

insiders during a worsened crisis.64

However, U.S. intelligence officials have expressed greater confidence regarding the security of

Islamabad’s nuclear weapons. Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte in testimony to

Congress on November 7, 2007 said he believed that there is “plenty of succession planning that’s going on in the Pakistani military” and that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are under “effective technical control.”65 Similarly, Donald Kerr, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, told a Washington audience May 29, 2008, that the Pakistani military’s control of the nuclear weapons is “a good thing because that’s an institution in Pakistan that has, in fact, withstood many of the political changes over the years.” A Department of Defense spokesperson told reporters December 9, 2008, that Washington has “no reason at this point to have any concern with regards to the security” of Islamabad’s nuclear arsenal. More recently, Maples stated March 10, 2009, that Islamabad “has taken important steps to safeguard its nuclear weapons,” although he pointed out that “vulnerabilities exist.”

Other governments have also voiced opinions regarding the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

For example, Indian National Security Adviser M. K. Narayanan said that the arsenal is safe and

has adequate checks and balances.66Similarly, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth

Affairs David Miliband told the Charlie Rose Show December 15, 2008, that Islamabad’s nuclear weapons “are under pretty close lock and key.” Russian Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov,

however, sounded somewhat less optimistic in a March 24, 2009, television interview, stating that Moscow is “very much concerned” about the security of Pakistan’s arsenal.67

Pakistani officials have consistently expressed confidence in the security of the country’s nuclear

arsenal. Then-President Musharraf stated in November 2007 that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are

under “total custodial controls.”68 More recently, President Asif Ali Zardari told CNN December

2, 2008, that the country’s nuclear command and control system “is working well.” Additionally,

a Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated May 21, 2009, that “there is simply no question

of our strategic assets falling into the wrong hands. We have full confidence in our procedures,

mechanisms and command and control systems.”

In addition to the above scenarios, the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons could also be

jeopardized by another conflict between India and Pakistan, Michael Krepon argued, explaining

that an “escalating war with nuclear forces in the field would increase the probability of

accidents, miscalculations, and the use of nuclear weapons.” This is because

[w]hen tensions rise precipitously with India, the readiness level of Pakistan’s nuclear

deterrent also rises. Because the geographical coordinates of Pakistan’s main nuclear weapon

storage sites, missile, and air bases can be readily identified from satellites—and therefore

targeted by opposing forces—the dictates of deterrence mandate some movement of

launchers and weapons from fixed locations during crises. Nuclear weapons on the move are

inherently less secure than nuclear weapons at heavily-guarded storage sites. Weapons and

launchers in motion are also more susceptible to “insider” threats and accidents.69

Such a war, Krepon added, would also place stress on the army’s unity of command. Krepon has

also pointed out that Islamabad faces a dilemma, because less-dispersed nuclear weapons may be

more vulnerable to a disarming military strike from India.70

U.S. Assistance and Pakistani Nuclear Security

U.S. plans to secure Pakistani nuclear weapons in case of a loss of control by the Pakistani

government were famously addressed during Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s confirmation

hearing in January 2005. In response to a question from Senator John Kerry asking what would

happen to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in the event of a radical Islamic coup in Islamabad,

Secretary Rice answered, “We have noted this problem, and we are prepared to try to deal with

it.”71 On November 12, 2007, responding to press reports about this contingency, a Pakistan

Foreign Office spokesperson said, “Pakistan possesses adequate retaliatory capacity to defend its

strategic assets and sovereignty,” emphasizing that Islamabad’s nuclear weapons have been under “strong multi-layered, institutionalized decision-making, organizational, administrative and command and control structures since 1998.”72The issue of U.S. contingency plans to take over Pakistani strategic assets was raised again in the press following Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, and was met with similar assurances by Pakistan’s government.73

More recently, a Pakistan Foreign Office spokesperson, responding to a report detailing alleged

U.S.-Pakistani discussions regarding contingency plans for U.S. forces to help secure Islamabad’s nuclear weapons, stated November 8, 2009, that Pakistan “does not require any foreign assistance in this regard.” Pakistan will never “allow any country to have direct or indirect access to its nuclear and strategic facilities,” the spokesperson said, adding that “no talks have ever taken place on the issue of the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal with US officials.”74 U.S.

Ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson stated the same day that the United States “has no

intention to seize Pakistani nuclear weapons or material.”

The United States reportedly offered Pakistan nuclear security assistance soon after September

11, 2001.75 U.S. assistance to Islamabad, which must comply with nonproliferation guidelines,

has reportedly included the sharing of best practices and technical measures to prevent

unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, as well as contribute to physical security of

storage facilities and personnel reliability.76 Some press reports say that the United States

provided Pakistan with Permissive Action Links (PALs) in 2003, although former Pakistani

military officials have said Pakistan has developed PALs for its warheads without assistance.77

PALs require a code to be entered before a weapon can be detonated. As noted above, Islamabad

employs a system requiring that at least two, and perhaps three, people authenticate launch codes

for nuclear weapons.78 Security at nuclear sites in Islamabad is the responsibility of a 10,000-

member security force, commanded by a two-star general.

Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage confirmed in a November 2007 interview

that there has been U.S. assistance in this area, explaining that the United States was unlikely to

intervene militarily in a crisis in Pakistan because “we have spent considerable time with the

Pakistani military, talking with them and working with them on the security of their nuclear

weapons. I think most observers would say that they are fairly secure. They have pretty

sophisticated mechanisms to guard the security of those.”79 Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, former Director

of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence at the U.S. Department of Energy, pointed

out in May 2009 that “there’s not a lot of transparency into” how Islamabad spends the U.S.

funds, but he nevertheless characterized them as “money well spent.”80 A Pakistani official said in November 2009 that Pakistan reserves the right to “pick and choose” the nuclear security

measures it will undertake, adding that Islamabad will only accept such measures that are “nonintrusive.”81

The extent to which Pakistan has shared information about its nuclear arsenal with the United

States is unclear. Although, as noted, former President Musharraf has acknowledged Islamabad’s

sharing of some information, General Tariq Majid, Chair of Pakistan’s Joint Chiefs of Staff

Committee, stated November 9, 2009, that “there is absolutely no question of sharing or allowing

any foreign individual, entity or a state, any access to sensitive information about our nuclear

assets.”82

The U.S. government has also reportedly offered assistance to secure or destroy radioactive

materials that could be used to make a radioactive dispersal device, and to ship highly enriched

uranium used in the Pakistani civilian nuclear sector out of the country.83 Pakistan’s response to

these proposals is unclear.

It is worth noting that, according to some observers, spent fuel from Pakistan’s Karachi and

Chasma nuclear power plants could be vulnerable to theft or attack.84 Pakistani officials have

expressed confidence in the security of its facilities, however.85

US and Western Concerns over Proliferation

Many observers are concerned that other states or terrorist organizations could obtain material or

expertise related to nuclear weapons from Pakistan.86 Beginning in the 1970s, Pakistan used

clandestine procurement networks to develop its nuclear weapons program. Former Pakistani

nuclear official A.Q. Khan subsequently used a similar network to supply Libya, North Korea,

and Iran with materials related to uranium enrichment.87

Al-Qaeda has also sought assistance from the Khan network. According to former Director of

Central Intelligence George Tenet, the United States “received fragmentary information from an

intelligence service” that in 1998 Osama bin Laden had “sent emissaries to establish contact”

with the network.88 Other Pakistani sources could also provide nuclear material to terrorist

organizations. According to a 2005 report by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of

the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, al-Qaeda “had established contact

with Pakistani scientists who discussed development of nuclear devices that would require hardto-obtain materials like uranium to create a nuclear explosion.”89 Tenet explains that these

scientists were affiliated with a different organization than the Khan network.

The current status of Pakistan’s nuclear export network is unclear, although most official U.S.

reports indicate that, at the least, it has been damaged considerably. Director of National

Intelligence John D. Negroponte implied that the network had been dismantled when he asserted

in a January 11, 2007, statement to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that “Pakistan

had been a major source of nuclear proliferation until the disruption of the A.Q. Khan network.”90

More recently, a January 12, 2009, State Department press release said that the network “is no

longer operating.” For its part, Pakistan’s Foreign Office stated February 7, 2009, that Pakistan

“has dismantled the nuclear black market network.” Asked during a July 20, 2009, interview

whether North Korea was transferring “nuclear weapons” or related advice to North Korea,

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton replied that there is “no evidence” that Pakistan is doing so.

However, when asked about the network’s current status during a July 25, 2007, Senate Foreign

Relations Committee hearing, Undersecretary for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns replied that:

I cannot assert that no part of that network exists, but it’s my understanding based on our

conversations with the Pakistanis that the network has been fundamentally dismantled. But

to say that there are no elements in Pakistan, I’m not sure I could say that.

Similarly, the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies found in a May 2007

report that “at least some of Khan’s associates appear to have escaped law enforcement attention

and could … resume their black-market business.”91

Asked about Pakistan’s cooperation in investigating the network, Burns acknowledged that the

United States has not had “personal, consistent access” to Khan, but added that he did not “have

all the details of everything we’ve done.” Similarly, the IAEA has not yet been able to interview

Khan directly, according to an agency official. However, Islamabad has responded to written

questions from the IAEA and has been cooperative with the agency’s investigation of Iran’s

nuclear program.92 Khan himself told Dawn News TV May 29, 2008, that he would not cooperate with U.S. or IAEA investigators. A Pakistani Foreign Office spokesperson told reporters in May 2006 that the government considered the Khan investigation “closed”—a position an Office spokesperson reiterated February 6, 2009.

The State Department announced January 12, 2009, that it was imposing sanctions on 13

individuals and three companies for their involvement in the Khan network. The sanctions were

imposed under the Export-Import Bank Act, the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, and

Executive Orders 12938 and 13382.

Pakistan’s Response over US and Western Concerns

Undersecretary Burns testified in July 2007 that the Bush administration has “told the Pakistani

government that it is its responsibility … to make sure” that neither the Khan network nor a

“similar organization” resurfaces in the country. Since the revelations about the Khan network,

Pakistan appears to have increased its efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. But whether and to

what extent these efforts have been successful is not yet clear. It is worth noting that, because

Khan conducted his proliferation activities as a government official, they do not necessarily

indicate a failure of Islamabad’s export controls.

Pakistani officials argue that Islamabad has taken a number of steps to prevent further

proliferation of nuclear-related technologies and materials.93 For example, Islamabad adopted in

September 2004 new national export controls legislation which includes a requirement that the

government issue control lists for “goods, technologies, material, and equipment which may

contribute to designing, development, stockpiling, [and] use” of nuclear weapons and related

delivery systems. According to a February 2008 presentation by Zafar Ali, Director of Pakistan’s

Strategic Export Controls Division (SECDIV),94 the lists, which were issued in October 2005 and are to be periodically updated, include items controlled by multilateral export control regimes, such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime.95 The export controls legislation also includes a catch-all clause, which requires exporters to notify the government if they are aware or suspect that goods or technology are intended by the end-user for use in nuclear or biological weapons, or missiles capable of

delivering such weapons.96

The legislation includes several other important elements, such as end-use and end-user

certification requirements and new penalties for violators. Since its adoption, Pakistan has

established the SECDIV and an associated Oversight Board. The SECDIV is responsible for

formulating rules and regulations for implementing the legislation. The board is comprised of

officials from multiple agencies and is headed by Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary.

Islamabad says that it has also taken several other steps to improve its nuclear security. For

example, the government announced in June 2007 that it is “implementing a National Security

Action Plan with the [IAEA's] assistance.” That same month, Pakistan also joined the U.S.- and

Russian-led Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. As noted above, the December 2007

National Command Authority Ordinance also includes measures to prevent the spread of nuclearrelated materials and expertise.

Pakistani officials participating in an April 2007 Partnership for Global Security workshop argued that Islamabad has improved the reliability of its nuclear personnel by, for example, making security clearance procedures more stringent. However, the officials also acknowledged that Islamabad still needs to do more to control its nuclear expertise.97 Similarly, Admiral Mullen stated May 14, 2009, that the country’s personnel reliability system must “continue to improve.”

The United States has also provided export control assistance to Pakistan. Burns described several such efforts in his July 2007 testimony.98 And according to an October 2007 U.S. Government Accountability Office report, Islamabad was during FY2003-FY2006 the second-largest recipient of bilateral U.S. assistance designed to improve target countries’ export controls. Pakistan received such assistance from the Departments of State, Energy, and Homeland Security.99

Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security-Designate Ellen Tauscher

told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Obama administration does not support

conditioning aid to Pakistan on permitting direct U.S. access to Khan, arguing, in part, that the

United States has “obtained a great deal of information about the Khan network without having

direct access to A.Q. Khan.”100

According The BBC News,Wednesday, 23 January 2008, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has dismissed fears that his country’s nuclear weapons could be acquired by Islamist militants.

A report last year recommended that the US send in special forces to help “secure the Pakistani nuclear arsenal”.

Pakistan’s foreign office dismissed the report as “outlandish musings”, insisting there was no danger of the country’s strategic assets falling into the wrong hands.

At the moment, few believe Islamists could take power in Pakistan. But there has been huge concern over Pakistan’s nuclear facilities since 2004. That was when the “father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb”, AQ Khan, confessed to leaking nuclear secrets to Iran, North Korea and Libya. He received a presidential pardon and has since been under house arrest. Pakistan’s government says he has revealed the full extent of his activities.

Estimates of the number of weapons Pakistan has vary from 40 to more than 100 warheads.

Once upon a time, the received wisdom was that Pakistan needed three bombs, to attack Delhi, Mumbai and Calcutta in neighbouring nuclear rival, India.

Dr Hoodbhoy Pakistan’s Nuclear Expert says more weapons means more people having access to the weapons facilities.

But he believes the actual weapons are safe.

“As far as the weapons themselves are concerned, I don’t believe they can be obtained by fundamentalist groups like al-Qaeda.

“The days of smuggling centrifuges out of Kahuta [Pakistan's main nuclear research facility] ended with AQ Khan.”

Another nuclear expert, Brig Shaukat Qadir, agrees on that point.

“Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are only as much at risk as those of the US or India,” he says.

“There are differing layers of security and everyone is checked and double checked while entering and leaving the facility.”

US assistance

According to Brig Qadir, even highly trained troops would find it almost impossible to storm Pakistan’s nuclear facilities.

President Musharraf pardoned AQ Khan

“In the first place there is the secrecy surrounding the actual weapons storage and development facilities,” he says.

“For example, while everybody talks about Kahuta, it is no longer the main facility.”

Then, he says, the way the nuclear facilities were built makes penetration nearly impossible. Facilities like Kahuta are built hundreds of feet underground.

Dr Hoodbhoy agrees that Pakistan has taken steps to increase the safety of its nuclear weapons. These include sending personnel who guard the facilities for training in the US.

He believes that even small amounts of enriched uranium or plutonium could not be smuggled out of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities.

“You need about 25kg to make a device the size of [that used at] Hiroshima, “Acquiring so much quantity of fissile material is not easy”.

Brig Qadir said: “Everybody understands the fissile material is the main component… do you really think it will be as readily available as that?

“Both the weapons and the fissile material are accorded the same level of security. The material, therefore has the same chance of being stolen as the weapons.”

Issues for US Congress

Members of US Congress have also expressed concerns regarding the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and related material. Senator Richard Lugar has spoken out in favor of using the cooperative threat reduction tools in Pakistan to help with the security of nuclear, biological, and chemical materials and weapons in the country.101

Additionally, a number of pieces of legislation appear designed to influence Islamabad’s policies

regarding the Khan network. Section 2 of H.R. 1463, which was introduced March 12, 2009, and

referred to the House Foreign Affairs Committee the same day, states that U.S. military assistance may be provided to Pakistan only if the President certifies that Islamabad is both making A.Q. Khan available to the United States for questioning and “providing adequate assurances to the United States Government that it will monitor Khan’s movements and activities in such a manner as to prevent his participation in any efforts to disseminate nuclear technology or know-how.”

This section allows the President to waive restrictions on U.S. assistance imposed pursuant to the

proposed legislation if the President “certifies to Congress that it is in the national interests of the

United States to do so.”H.R. 2481, the United States-Pakistan Security and Stability Act, which was introduced May 19, 2009, and referred the same day to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the House Armed Services Committee, and the House Intelligence Committee, would require the President to “develop and transmit to the appropriate congressional committees a comprehensive interagency strategy and implementation plan for long-term security and stability in Pakistan.” The strategy is to include a “description of how United States assistance” authorized by the bill “will be used to achieve the objectives of United States policy toward Pakistan,” one of which is “to empower and enable” Islamabad to “maintain robust command and control over its nuclear weapons technology.” The bill would authorize foreign assistance for Pakistan, including funds for improving the government’s counter-insurgency capability.

H.R. 1886, the Pakistan Enduring Assistance and Cooperation Enhancement Act of 2009, would

authorize U.S. assistance to Pakistan for a variety of purposes. These include strengthening

democratic institutions and law enforcement, as well as supporting economic development,

education, human rights, and heath care. The bill would also authorize additional U.S. security

assistance for Islamabad. However, Section 206 of the bill places conditions on some of this

assistance; it states that no U.S. military assistance shall be provided to Pakistan if the President

has not made a series of determinations, one of which is that the government “is continuing to

cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the

acquisition of nuclear weapons related materials, including, as necessary, providing access to

Pakistani nationals associated with such networks.” The section includes a national security

waiver. The bill also requires a report to Congress that includes a “description of Pakistan’s

efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise” and an “assessment of

whether assistance provided to Pakistan pursuant to this Act has directly or indirectly aided the

expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program.” The committee report underlines continuing

concerns about getting full information about the activities of the Khan network and development of Pakistan’s own nuclear arsenal:

Pakistan’s history of nuclear development and Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan’s establishment of a

nuclear proliferation network remain a source for concern to many in the United States,

particularly since the Committee understands that representatives of the United States have

not interviewed certain individuals involved in the network. The Committee believes the

United States should continue to engage the Government of Pakistan on the network, and

should, as necessary, obtain direct access to the individuals covered by this subsection,

including Dr. Khan. The Committee also maintains strong concerns regarding recent reports

of Pakistan expansion of its nuclear arsenal. Given the expanding threat of Pakistan’s

domestic insurgency, the Government of Pakistan’s further development of nuclear materials

appears inconsistent with its immediate security threats and is unhelpful in the context of

efforts to strengthen U.S.-Pakistani relations.

H.R. 1886 was introduced April 2, 2009, and referred the same day to both the House Foreign

Affairs Committee and Rules Committee. The Foreign Affairs Committee reported the bill May

22, and the Rules Committee discharged it the same day. The bill was referred to the House

Armed Services Committee May 22 and discharged June 2. On June 11, the House passed H.R.

1886, which was appended to H.R. 2410, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years

2010 and 2011. H.R. 2410 has been received by the Senate and referred to the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee.

The Senate passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (S. 962) unanimously on

June 24, 2009. This bill would provide aid to Pakistan but does not include conditions regarding

the nuclear nonproliferation or nuclear weapo

Selected Laws » Security

Western Concern Over Security Of Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal

At Threat to National Security; Improper Document Shredding